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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the choice and the pricing of callable and non-callable bonds. The 
popularity of callable and non-callable bonds is significantly related to the economic 
environment. Callable bonds are also more likely to be issued via a shelf prospectus and are 
more likely to be issued by banks than non-callable bonds. Evidently, firms that prefer to 
issue callable bonds seek to take advantage of their ability to process economic information 
but must pay a premium relative to straight bonds for the call feature. Firms that issue 
callable bonds do not consistently display the characteristics associated with severe agency 
problems.  
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1. Introduction  
In recent years, many observers note that the popularity of callable bonds is declining. 
For example, Kalotay (2008) and Banko and Zhou (2010) observe that the portion of callable 
have been declining over the last 20 years and its popularity has shifted towards the below 
investment grade segment of the corporate bond market. However, no explanation is offered 
for this trend. In contrast, our more recent sample finds that new issues of callable bonds are 
becoming increasingly popular. Figure 1 shows that while only 20% of all newly issued, US 
dollar, fixed coupon corporate bonds are callable in 1995, year by year the popularity of 
callable bonds increases until 2006 from where the popularity of callable bonds decreases 
again. We do not know why there is such a variation in the choice between callable and non-
callable bonds. Therefore, we develop a set of hypothesis and test them in an attempt to 
explain why the popularity of call provisions change. 
<<Figure 1 about here>> 
A call option empowers the issuer to take advantage of bondholders by repaying the 
debt in advance when market yields decline. When interest rates decrease, the call price is less 
than what the fair value of a debt would have been absent the call option.  Following Kraus 
(1973), finance has rejected financial gain as an explanation for call provisions since in an 
efficient market, gains to shareholders via refinancing at lower interest rates would be 
anticipated and expropriated by bondholders in the terms of the initial call provision. Instead, 
authors such as Thatcher (1985), Kish and Livingston (1992), and Boreiko and Lombardo 
(2011), suggest agency explanations can explain the use of call provisions. While earlier 
empirical evidence such as Crabbe and Helwege (1994) could not find empirical support for 
individual agency theoretic explanations for callable bonds, more recent work by Banko and 
Zhou (2010) and Chen, Mao and Wang (2010) find that call options are used to resolve a 
combination of asymmetric information, underinvestment and risk shifting agency problems.  
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Another argument suggests that some issuers can use callable bonds to hedge interest 
rate risk. In fact, Banko and Zhou (2010) find some evidence of this for investment grade 
callable bonds. Recently, Choi, Jameson and Jung (2013) observe that asymmetric 
information generates an incentive to issue callable debt even when market conditions do not 
support a separating equilibrium. This happens because an information asymmetry that leads 
the market to overestimate the issuer’s default probability, also leads it to undervalue the call 
premium. Still, agency theoretic, asymmetric information and hedging rationales for call 
provisions do not provide an explanation for the time varying popularity for callable bonds.   
This raises several interesting questions. Are there any factors that can explain the 
shifting popularity of callable bonds relative to non-callable bonds? If so, do firms that issue 
callable bonds process economic information to take advantage of these factors and does this 
influence the preferred practise for issuing callable bonds? Do issuers pay a premium for the 
call feature? Finally, do firms that issue callable bonds display any characteristics associated 
with agency problems?  
This paper is related to a series of papers that examines the motivation and pricing of 
different types of callable bonds. Daniels, Ejara and Vijayakumar (2009) examine the 
motivation and pricing of bond claw backs, while Nayar and Stock (2008) do the same for 
make whole bonds. Claw backs and make whole bonds are special types of callable bonds that 
restrict the refunding of callable bonds to issues of equity (claw backs) or adjusts the call 
price at the date of call (make whole). Banko and Zhou (2010) revisit the agency theoretic 
explanations for callable bonds and Chen, Mao and Wang (2010) examine the refunding 
behavior of callable bonds. We add to this body of work by examining the time varying 
popularity of ordinary callable bonds and the influence that the issue process, bond covenants 
and the economic environment has on the offer spread for callable and non-callable bonds. 
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Our main contribution is to investigate why the popularity of ordinary callable bonds is 
time varying. We discover that the popularity of callable bonds relative to non-callable bonds 
is related to the economic environment. Specifically, the likelihood of new issues of callable 
bonds decreases in the level and slope of the term structure, in interest rate volatility and in 
the credit spread. Since we do find evidence that the demand for callable bonds is not random, 
it follows that there can be firms that can process information more effectively than others. 
Our second contribution is to find that banks, being just the sort of firm likely to develop 
superior ability to process interest rate information, are more likely than non-banks to issue 
callable bonds using institutional arrangements that allows them to quickly issue callable 
bonds in response to newly developed information. However, after correcting for self-
selection bias, we find that issuers of callable bonds pay around 24 basis points relative to 
non-callable bonds for the option to call a bond prior to maturity. Clearly, our results support 
Kraus (1973) in that issuers of callable bonds do not save on interest costs by issuing callable 
bonds. 
Consistent with the literature, we find mixed evidence that firms use callable bonds to 
deal with agency problems. On the one hand, lower rated and less profitable firms, just the 
type of firm most likely to experience severe agency problems, are more likely to issue 
callable bonds. On the other hand, callable bonds are also more likely to be issued by larger 
firms via competitive bids, the sort of firms not normally thought of as subject to severe 
agency problems. Moreover, callable bonds are less likely to contain restrictive covenants that 
can further alleviate agency concerns. 
In the next section we develop our hypothesis concerning the motivation for issuing 
callable bonds. Section 3 discusses the data and the sample selection while section 4 develops 
a model that examines the choice and the offer spread of callable bonds relative to non-
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callable bonds. We then present our empirical findings in section 5, robustness investigations 
in section 6 and our conclusions in section 7. 
 
2. Reasons for Issuing a Callable Bond 
We do not know why the popularity of call provisions varies through time. Clearly, 
there is more to the dynamics of the callable bond market that we can, at present, explain. 
Below, we explain our hypotheses concerning callable bonds into three sets of hypotheses, the 
economic environment, asymmetric information and agency problems. Table 1 provides a 
summary of our detailed hypothesis.  
<< Please insert Table 1 about here>> 
A. Economic Environment 
Changes in the economic environment can explain the time varying popularity of 
callable versus non-callable bonds because changes in the level, slope and volatility of the 
term structure and changes in the credit spread implies that the costs and benefits of call 
provisions can vary. If interest rates mean revert, then a rise in interest rates suggest that 
callable bonds will become more popular because as interest rates later fall the bond can be 
called to benefit the firm’s shareholders. Of course, as Kraus (1973) would argue, bond 
investors can anticipate mean reversion too and so can require a higher call premium in 
response to an increase in interest rates. This can discourage new issues of callable bonds so 
we cannot a priori sign the relation between the level of interest rates and the popularity of 
callable bond issues. 
Fama (1984), Hardouvelis (1988) and Mishkin (1988) all find that increases in the 
forward rate are associated with higher future spot rates of interest. Estrella and Mishkin 
(1997) find that increases in the slope of the term structure are associated with increases in 
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anticipated inflation while Estrella and Mishkin (1998) and Ang et al. (2006) also find that 
decreases in the slope of the term structure foreshadow poor economic conditions. This 
suggests that an increase in the slope of the term structure, signalling a rise in forward rates, 
can foreshadow economic events that can lead to a rise in interest rates. Therefore as the 
slope of the term structure rises, callable bonds issues can be less popular as fewer firms 
expect to benefit by calling them.  
A rise in interest rate volatility, increase the value of the call option embedded in the 
callable bond making new issues of callable bonds more expensive. Therefore, as interest rate 
volatility rises, callable bond issues are discouraged as call premiums rise. Finally, callable 
bonds can benefit from a narrowing of the credit spread because if corporate bond yields fall 
as credit conditions improve, the option to call, moves towards in the money. Van Horne 
(2001) suggests that there is a credit cycle that is coincident with the economic cycle. This 
implies that as credit spreads widen (narrow), calling the bond is unlikely (likely) as credit 
conditions weaken (strengthen) and so callable bonds are less (more) popular as issuers are 
unlikely (likely) to benefit. Martel (2008) on a study exploring domestic and international 
bond spreads indicate that domestic spreads are related to the lagged component of sovereign 
spreads. 
B. Asymmetric Information 
Shelf registered bonds are bonds that can be issued quickly in response to market events 
as most of the detailed information requirements are already filed with regulatory authorities. 
If firms have some special ability to process interest rate information, then their ability to take 
advantage of newly developed information will be enhanced by employing shelf registered 
bonds. Therefore, if issuers do have some special ability to process interest rate information, 
they are likely to issue callable bonds via shelf registration.  
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Financial firms that perform the banking function, that is borrowing money at low rates 
of interest, usually at short terms, and then lending this money at higher, often at fixed interest 
rates, for longer terms, are vitally concerned with changes in the interest rate and credit 
environment. It is possible that callable bonds can help manage the spread between lending 
and borrowing rates. If banks develop expertise in forecasting interest rates and credit 
conditions, then they can derive hedging strategies from issuing callable bonds. Therefore, we 
expect that banks are more likely to issue callable bonds than firms in other industries.  
C. Agency Problems 
It is well noted in the literature  (see Thatcher (1985), Robbins and Schatzberg (1986), 
Kish and Livingston (1992), Boreiko and Lombardo (2011) as examples) that small, modestly 
profitable, low credit rating firms suffer from agency problems. Therefore, if callable bonds 
are used to alleviate agency problems, then small, low profit and low credit rating firms will 
favour callable bonds. Kwan and Carleton (2010) also find that small, lower rated firms 
include restrictive covenants in bond issues and are more likely to issue bonds privately. As 
small, low profit and low credit rating firms will likely have restrictive access to capital 
because of agency problems, we expect that small, low profit and low credit rating firms 
issuing callable bonds will likely issue them privately. Because investors in bonds of small, 
low profit and low credit rating firms will likely require higher security and restrictive 
covenants to protect their investment from agency problems, we expect that callable bonds 
will likely contain restrictive and high security covenants. Since this suggests that the callable 
bond contract is complex, new issues of callable bonds are likely sold via negotiation rather 
than competitive bid.1 
                                                          
1 Bonds sold by negotiation are underwritten issues where the lead underwriter often commits to a fixed 
selling price and attempts to profit from the difference between the price paid to the issuer and the eventual 
investors. Bonds sold by competitive bids are sold to a successful underwriter from among several who 
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3. Data Selection 
We use the Mergent® Inc’s Fixed Investment Securities Database FISD. The FISD 
consists of detailed cross sectional information on issue characteristics of all bonds that the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners had on their books as of January 1, 1995, 
and all bonds that they bought up to and including May 27, 2008. Each of the approximately 
100,000 bond issues is identified by the ISIN number and includes information on the 
maturity date, offering date, rating date, rating, rating type, broad industry category, industry 
sub sector and type of call provision.  
From the FISD, we select all bonds that were issued on or after January 1, 1995 because 
prior to that date the NAIC had to backdate old issues in order to add them to the database. It 
is possible that bonds that have since matured prior to January 1, 1995 were not included so 
use of these backdated bonds can introduce some unknown survivorship bias. We select all 
bonds that belong to the industrial, financial, and utility industries while we eliminate 
Treasury, other government and agency bonds and preferred shares. Therefore our sample 
contains corporate bonds only. We select only fixed coupon bonds as we wish to concentrate 
on the straightforward choice among callable and non-callable bonds. On examining these 
corporate bonds for rating type we find that Duff and Phelps do not rate many bonds within 
each rating category. Moreover, virtually all bonds rated by Duff and Phelps are also rated by 
one of the other mainstream rating agencies, so we decide to neglect Duff and Phelps ratings. 
However, we consider all Standard and Poor’s, Moodys and Fitch rated bonds because they 
                                                                                                                                                                       
submitted sealed bids. Competitive bids can lower the all in cost of issuing debt if there is a lot of interest 
from potential underwriters. One method of encouraging interest from potential underwriters is to simplify 
the bond prospectus. Hence, the choice between negotiated vs. competitive bid issues can be related to the 
choice between detailed, complex contract terms tailored to a given firm’s circumstance vs. a simplified 
prospectus to encourage active bidding to reduce issuing costs. 
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rate a large number of bonds in all industry categories.2 We only keep bonds with a rating 
date within one year of the offering date to ensure that the bond under study has the same 
rating it had on the date it was offered. To report the characteristics of the sample by rating we 
convert Standard and Poors, Moodys and Fitch letter ratings into numerical equivalents from 
21 (AAA) to 1 (C or D).3 
From this initial selection of bonds, we select two sub samples, the ordinary callable 
and the non-callable bond sub samples. Ordinary callable bonds are bonds flagged as 
callable but do not contain a put, conversion, make whole or claw back provision whereas 
non-callable bonds are bonds that do not contain any of these provisions including an 
ordinary call provision.4 We note that convertible bonds can be used to deal with agency 
problems and in fact Daniels (2009) finds evidence to support this assertion. Other types 
of call features such as make whole and claw back features have been studied by Goyal et 
                                                          
2 We neglect bonds that were not rated as only very few bonds, less than 20, have no rating by one of the 
three rating agencies, and it is not clear how these bonds can be included in later regressions where the 
credit ranking appears as a key independent variable. 
3 All rating agencies have an almost identical rating system with eight broad rating categories, six of 
which are sub divided into three shades of ratings. At the lower end there appears to be a minor deviation 
where Standard and Poors has one lower rating D and Fitch has two additional lower ratings of DD and 
DDD than Moodys so that in total Moodys has 21, Standard and Poors 22 and Fitch 24 ratings. However 
this deviation is minor as very few bonds have a rating of D, DD or DDD within one year of issue so we 
simply assign the same numerical rating of one to Moodys’ rating of C, Standard and Poors’ ratings of C 
and D, and Fitch’s ratings of C, D, DD and DDD. 
4 Make whole and claw back bonds are bonds that contain special call provisions that restrict the 
conditions and price upon which a callable bond can be called. For details see Goyal et al (1998) and Nayar 
and Stock (2008). We delete approximately 4,500 bonds from our sample that contain a make whole, a claw 
back, a convertible, or a put provision to ensure we are dealing with pure types of ordinary callable or non-
callable bonds.  
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al. (1998), Powers and Sarkar (2006), Nayar and Stock (2008) and Daniels et al. (2009). 
We are interested in whether ordinary call features are related to changes in economic 
circumstances and we have nothing to add concerning the use of convertible, make whole 
or claw back bonds. We chose to neglect these securities as they are complex, sometimes 
containing a put feature and typically containing an ordinary call feature making it 
difficult to separate the motivations for including ordinary call features in convertible, 
make whole and claw back bonds and obscuring the relation between changes in the 
economic environment and the popularity of issues of ordinary callable bonds.  
We then collect additional security specific information such as the offer spread and 
match the security’s CUSIP with the issuing firm to collect company data, such as the return 
on assets, for the year that the security was offered. These selection procedures leave a total 
sample of 5,776 bonds consisting of 2,748 ordinary callable (hereafter callable) and 3,028 
non-callable bonds. We note that this sample size is comparable to other recent studies 
investigating bonds using the FISD including Daniels et al. (2009), 6,978 bonds, Banko and 
Zhou (2010), 2,109 bonds and Nayar and Stock (2008), 336 bonds. Table 2 reports the details 
of the callable and non-callable bond sub samples. 
<< Please insert Table 2 about here>> 
Table 2 reveals three notable characteristics of our sample of callable and non-callable 
bonds. First, examining the sub samples of bonds by industry, we note that while non-callable 
and callable bonds are popular in all industries, there is a noticeable concentration of callable 
bonds in the financial industry. Second, except for the utility industry, ordinary callable and 
non-callable bonds have the same average ratings both being somewhat higher in the finance 
and somewhat lower in the industrial industry sectors. Even in the utility industry, the 
difference in the average rating are minor, callable bonds having a somewhat lower average 
rating of A- and non-callable bonds having a higher rating of A+. Third, we note that in all 
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industries, non-callable bonds tend to have much shorter scheduled maturities than their 
callable bond counterparts. Since the actual maturity of callable bonds is likely to be shorter 
than the scheduled maturity, one should be cautious in drawing conclusions about differences 
in scheduled maturity.  
4. Model Development 
The FISD contains variables that indicate the presence of the full range of bond 
covenants including restrictive bond features and the security level. There is also an 
indicator for whether the bond was sold by soliciting competitive bids or by negotiation. As 
bond market and company level data is not available from the FISD we employ three 
additional sources of information. Treasury market information is collected from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York and other bond market information is collected from 
DataStream. We also collect company level information from Bloomberg. The Bloomberg 
database contains financial statement information that can be linked to the FISD bond 
information via the nine-digit CUSIP numbers.5 
We collect the one and ten year constant maturity Treasury interest rates from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Table H6. We proxy the level of the term structure as 
the one year rate and the slope of the term structure as the difference between the ten year 
and one year constant maturity rates. We collect at the money 5 year cap rates and the yield 
on the Merrill Lynch high yield index from DataStream. At the money caps represent the 
implied volatility from five year interest rate caps and are our proxy for interest rate 
volatility. The difference between the yield on the Merrill Lynch high yield index and the 
one year Treasury rate is our proxy for the credit spread on the bond market. 
                                                          
5 In performing the match of the Bloomberg data with the FISD database we gratefully acknowledge 
expert help from the staff of Bloomberg data. All of the subsequent matches made by CUSIPS were double 
checked by matching company names. 
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We wish to determine the variables that influence the popularity of callable bonds and 
the offer spread of callable and non-callable bonds. As we discuss in section 3, firms will 
self-select callable bonds according to the economic environment, asymmetric information 
and agency problems hypotheses so we must adjust our inquiry for self-selection bias. 
Heckman (1979) provides the methodology for dealing with self-selection bias by treating 
the problem as a case of an omitted variable. We follow Heckman’s (1979) two stage 
procedure by first running a probit selection equation to extract the inverse mills ratio and 
then use the inverse mills ratio as an independent variable in an offer spread regression. The 
inverse mills ratio then proxies for the unexplained factors that led to the selection of a given 
bond type thereby accounting for the influence of self-selection.  
Our selection equation investigates determinates of the popularity of callable bonds 
relative to non-callable bonds and the offer spread equation, corrected for self-selection bias, 
investigates determinates of the offer spread of bonds. The selection equation is: 
 
 
where i refers to a given bond and CB = 1 if the bond is callable, zero otherwise. All 
variables are defined in Table 3 and except for ISSUE AMOUNT and MATURITY, are 
designed to test our hypotheses discussed in Section 1 and summarized in Table 1.  The 
control variables ISSUE AMOUNT and MATURITY are included in the selection equation 
because the amount and the maturity of an issue can have a bearing as to whether a callable 
or a non-callable bond issue is chosen. We estimate (1) using maximum likelihood probit 
(1)                                                      )MATURITY AMOUNT 
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regressions for the full sample of 5,776 observations. The standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and we extract the inverse mills ratio from (1).  
<<Please insert Table 3 about here>> 
The offer spread equation contains the variables that we expect to determine the offer 
spread.  
 
The dependent variable (Yi-Ym)i is the offer spread, that is the difference between 
the offering yield for a given corporate bond i and the yield on corresponding maturity m 
Treasury bond, MILLSOC is the estimated inverse mill’s ratio from (1). All other 
variables are as previously defined except that we include two industry dummy variables, 
FINANCIAL and UTILITY because the systematic risk of the financial, utility and 
industrial company sectors can be different and so influence the offer spread. Also, we 
include a dummy variable CALLABLE that is one if the bond is callable, zero otherwise. 
The coefficient of CALLABLE will measure the extra yield required by a callable 
relative to a non-callable bond once the effect of self-selection is accounted for. Kraus 
(1973) suggests this coefficient will be positive.  
 
5. Empirical Results 
Table 4 reports the result of the selection equation (1) and is meant to shed light on 
what determines the characteristics and the type of a bond a firm will issue.  The regression 
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seems to explain the data reasonably well with a pseudo R-square of 64.7%. Moreover, 
eleven of thirteen coefficients representing hypotheses summarized in Table 1 are 
significant. The control variables ISSUE AMOUNT and MATURITY show that relative to 
straight bonds, callable bond issues are smaller and of a longer scheduled maturity. 
<< Please insert Table 4 about here>> 
A. Economic Environment and Asymmetric Information 
The first four variables, from LEVEL to CREDIT SPREAD, examine the influence of 
the economic environment on bond issue choice. Clearly, the higher the current (LEVEL) 
and anticipated (SLOPE) interest rate, the more unlikely callable bonds are issued. This 
suggests that bond investors anticipate mean reversion so that higher rates of current and 
future interest rates imply that, eventually, the bonds will be called to the financial 
advantage of the firm. Evidently, firms are discouraged from issuing callable bonds as call 
premiums rise in anticipation of future lower rates and so issue non-callable bonds instead. 
Similarly, as volatility rises, the call option embedded in callable bonds becomes more 
expensive making non-callable bonds the more attractive funding option. Finally, as the 
credit spread widens, firms are less likely to issue callable bonds. This is consistent with 
Van Horne (2001) who suggests that there is a credit cycle that is coincident with the 
economic cycle. Therefore as credit spreads widen, calling the bond is unlikely as credit 
conditions weaken and so callable bonds are less popular as issuers are unlikely to benefit.  
The next two variables, SHELF and BANK, examine the influence of asymmetric 
information on the likelihood of issuing callable instead of non-callable bonds. We find that 
issuers of callable bonds are likely to employ shelf registration.  Evidently, firms that issue 
callable bonds act as though they have some ability to process interest rate information, 
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waiting for the “right” economic environment to quickly issue callable bonds via shelf 
registration.  
In section 1 we suggest that banks can develop an informational advantage in 
processing interest rate information and so would favour issuing callable bonds to manage 
interest rate and credit risk. Clearly, Table 4 provides strong support as the BANK 
coefficient is positive and highly significant for callable bonds.  
B. Agency Problems 
Firms that suffer most from agency problems are expected to be smaller, lower rated 
and modestly profitable firms that have restricted access to capital and so tend to issue bonds 
privately. Table 4 shows that low rated (RATING) and modestly profitable (ROA) firms do 
tend to issue callable bonds. However, all other characteristics of callable bonds do not 
support, and in some cases refute, the hypothesis that callable bonds are used to respond to 
agency problems. There is no significant relation between callable bonds and the likelihood 
that the bonds would be issued privately. Callable bonds are more likely to be issued by 
relatively large rather than small firms (COMPANY SIZE) who are thought to be less prone 
to agency problems. To protect themselves from agency problems, one would expect 
bondholders to insist on restrictive covenants (RESTRICT) and high security (SECURITY) 
yet callable bonds are less likely than non-callable bonds to include restrictive covenants and 
there is no significant relation to the security level. Finally, if callable bonds are a response 
to agency problems, one would expect that the bond will be issued via negotiation as 
investors will wish to discuss the details of the bond covenants in order to secure protection 
from potential agency problems. Instead, callable bonds are more likely to be issued via 
competitive bids suggesting that there is a pool of investors that are sanguine about the 
prospect of agency problems. 
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C. Offer Spreads 
Table 5 reports the result of the offer spread equation (2) and is meant to shed light on 
what determines the offer spread for callable bonds. One can judge the economic 
significance of each coefficient by noting that the coefficients are denominated in per cent. 
For example, an issue via shelf registration SHELF can save an extra 24.5 basis points on 
average relative to all other issues.  
<< Please insert Table 5 about here>> 
A special feature of (2) is the inverse mill’s ratio coefficient which adjusting for self-
selection bias. While the inverse mills ratio for callable bonds is modest in size, 8.7 basis 
points, it is highly significant. Once the impact of self-select is accounted for, the 
CALLABLE coefficient means that issuers of callable bonds must pay a premium of 24.3 
basis points for the flexibility to call the bond prior to maturity and clearly suggests that 
investors demand and receive compensation for call risk just as financial theory suggests. 
Eleven of the remaining sixteen slope coefficients are statistically significant. 
Specifically, the offer spread decreases in RATING but increases in restrictive covenants 
(RESTRICT). The later coefficient suggests that investors recognize that restrictions are an 
imperfect solution to a problem of concern to the investors and so require a higher offer 
spread in spite of their inclusion in the bond contract.6 Employing a competitive bid 
(COMPETITIVE) reduces the offer spread but offering the bond as a PRIVATE issue 
requires a higher offer spread. Meanwhile, firms with higher debt burdens (TDR) pay a 
higher offer spread whereas firms with higher liquidity (QR) pay a lower offer spread. As 
                                                          
6 Only Daniels et al. (2009) consider the influence of restrictive bond covenants on bond type selection. 
We agree with their results that callable bonds are unlikely to include restrictive covenants but 
unfortunately they do not examine the influence of restrictive covenants on the offer spread. 
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the LEVEL, SLOPE and VOLATILITY of the term structure rises, indicating higher current 
and possibly foreshadowing higher rates of interest, the offer spreads on corporate bonds 
decrease. This result is consistent with Duffee (1998) and Papageorgiou and Skinner (2006) 
who find an inverse relation between the level and the slope of the Treasury term structure 
and the offer spread on corporate bonds. Meanwhile the offer spread increases in the 
CREDIT SPREAD. 
 
6. Robustness Tests 
We check the robustness of our results by time period, by broad credit rating 
categories and by financial verses non-financial industry status as we wish to ensure that the 
relation among economic variables and the choice between callable and non-callable bonds 
really do vary consistently with aspects of the term structure and the credit spread. For the 
time period check, we run our selection model on thirteen annual sub periods to find that 
only rarely are the coefficients of a different sign and statistically significant from those 
reported in Table 4. An exception occurs in 2004 where the level, slope and volatility 
coefficients are perversely positive. We note that in 2004, the one year rate of interest rose 
and the slope decreased, reversing the trend of the prior 2 or 3 years. Perhaps issuers of 
callable bonds were surprised by this reversal so that as these trends continued into 2005, the 
usual inverse relation between the popularity of callable bonds and increases in the level and 
slope of the term structure, interest rate volatility and the credit spread, reasserted itself.7  
We also check the relation between the choice of callable versus non-callable bonds by 
broad rating classes because some authors such as Banko and Zhou (2010) suggest that the 
motivation for issuing callable bonds can vary by very broad rating classes. To accomplish 
                                                          
7 These results are available from the corresponding author upon request. 
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this task we eliminate the single independent variable RATING from (1) and (2) and instead 
run these models three times, once each for bonds rated high investment grade AAA/AA-, 
medium investment grade A+/BBB- and below investment grade BB+ and lower The result 
of this exercise is reported in Tables 6 and 7 for the selection and offer spread equations 
respectively. 
<< Please insert Tables 6 and 7 about here>> 
First, looking are the proxies for the economic environment hypothesis in Table 6, 
from LEVEL to CREDIT SPREAD, we find that when a coefficient is significant, it agrees 
with the results reported earlier in Table 4. For the asymmetric information hypothesis we 
do find one exception.  Callable bonds are unlikely to be issued via shelf registration if they 
are rated below investment grade. 
Consistent with Banko and Zhou (2010), one proxy for the Agency Costs hypotheses, 
COMPANY SIZE does deviate by credit quality. Specifically for very high credit quality 
and for very low credit quality bonds, smaller companies rather than larger companies are 
more likely to issue callable bonds. This result adds weight to the argument that callable 
bonds  can be used to deal with agency costs, particularly for low rated, smaller companies 
where agency costs tend to be most severe. Table 7 reports that the credit rating stratified 
offer spread model (2) is the same as the main estimates with exceptions concentrated in the 
high investment grade category. For highest credit quality bonds only, offer spreads decrease 
in the TDR and increase in COMPANY SIZE and LEVEL and SLOPE of the yield curve.  
Next, we examine the relation between the choice of callable versus non-callable 
bonds by finance industry and non-finance industry as Table 2 shows that callable bonds are 
very popular in the finance industry. To accomplish this task, we eliminate the industry 
based dummy variables and instead run (2) and (3) twice, once each for bonds issued by 
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financial and then non-financial firms. Tables 7 and 8 report the results of this exercise for 
the selection and offer spread equations respectively. 
<<Tables 7 and 8 about here>> 
Table 7 reports that the results for the economic environment and asymmetric 
information hypothesis are the same as our main results reported in Table 4 with the minor 
exception that for non-financial bonds, it is marginally more likely that callable bonds will 
be issued as the credit spread rises. This result supports Choi, Jameson and Jung (2013) who 
suggest that information asymmetry can lead the market to overestimate the issuer’s default 
probability, thereby leading the market to undervalue the call premium and encourage the 
firm to issue a callable bond. When examining the agency problem hypothesis we find 
several differences in the issue behaviour but still the overall conclusion remains the same, 
neither financial nor non-financial callable bonds consistently display the characteristics 
associated with severe agency problems.  
Finally, Table 9 report results that are almost entirely consistent with our main results 
reported in Table 5. The sole exception is that offer spreads increase in liquidity (QR) for 
financial firms. This result is not surprising as an increase in the quick ratio also implies a 
larger portion of the financial firm’s income producing assets are tied up into low yield 
assets raising the possibility that the firm is in difficulty in competing in its’ chosen market. 
More interestingly, we find that after adjusting for self-selection bias, financial firms pay a 
higher call premium than non-financial firms, 48.8 basis points as compared to 13.4 basis 
points. Presumably, financial firms can have asymmetric information concerning when it 
would be best for them to issue callable bonds. Savvy investors recognize this information 
asymmetry and charge a correspondingly higher call premium. 
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7. Conclusions 
In response to the questions raised in the introduction, the findings of this paper imply 
that: (1) the popularity of callable bonds is influenced by changes in the term structure and 
the credit spread; (2) callable bonds are more likely to be issued via a shelf prospectus; (3) 
callable bonds are more likely to be issued by banks rather than by other types of firms; (4) 
callable bonds are issued via competitive bids by larger firms, the sort of firms not normally 
thought of as subject to severe agency problems and (5) firms that choose to issue callable 
bonds must pay a premium relative to straight bonds for the call feature. Overall, this paper 
contributes to our understanding of the selection of the call feature and on the determinate of 
offer spreads of callable and non-callable corporate bondsan important corporate finance 
issue. 
In more detail, the findings of this study imply that factors related to the economic 
environment and asymmetric information can consistently explain the shifting popularity of 
callable bonds relative to non-callable bonds. As the current and anticipated rates of interest, 
interest rate volatility and the credit spread on corporate bonds rises, callable bonds are less 
likely to be issued. Issuers of callable bonds are likely to be institutions that can develop 
special expertise in processing economic information (BANKS) using procedures that 
enable them to take advantage of newly developed information (SHELF). However, firms 
that issue callable bond must pay a premium for the privilege to call the bond and financial 
firms that can have some special expertise in choosing when to issue a callable bond pay 
more for the call feature than non-financial firms just as financial theory would suggest. 
However, we find mixed support for agency problems explanation for issuing callable 
bonds. If callable bonds are used to alleviate agency problems, we would expect that firms 
subject to severe agency problems would be more likely to issue callable bonds with 
secondary characteristics designed to further alleviate agency problems. Some of the 
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characteristics of firms issuing callable bonds, such as lower ROA and ratings are consistent 
but another important characteristic, firm size, is not always consistent with agency theory. 
Moreover, all of the secondary characteristics of callable bonds, such as higher security, the 
presence of restrictive covenants and issuing callable bonds via negotiation rather than 
competitive bids prove to be just the opposite as expected by agency theory. 
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Table 1.  
The hypothesized relations between bond issue characteristics and issues of ordinary 
callable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Factors/Variables Callable Bonds 
Economic Environment     
LEVEL Positive/Negative 
SLOPE Negative 
VOLATILITY Negative 
CREDIT SPREAD Negative 
Asymmetric Information  
SHELF Positive 
BANK Positive 
Agency  
PRIVATE Positive 
COMPANY SIZE Negative 
ROA Negative 
RATING Negative 
SECURITY Positive 
RESTRICT Positive 
COMPETITIVE Negative 
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Table 2. Sample Characteristics 
This table reports the number of bond issues by industry, type and rating during the 
period January 1, 1995 to May 8, 2008 
 Industrial Financial Utility All 
Grade Ordinary 
Call 
Non-
Callable 
Sub 
Total 
Ordinary 
Call 
Non-
Callable 
Sub 
Total 
Ordinary 
Call 
Non-
Callable 
Sub 
Total 
Grand 
Total 
AAA 167 81 248 104 79 183 12 23 35 466 
AA+ 0 14 14 24 40 64     78 
AA 5 70 75 265 16 281 0 2 2 358 
AA- 18 101 119 119 27 146 3 27 30 295 
A+ 5 128 133 32 281 313 6 33 39 485 
A 247 160 407 763 79 842 5 78 83 1332 
A- 3 237 240 180 259 439 0 77 77 756 
BBB+ 3 226 229 127 60 187 2 74 76 492 
BBB 5 211 216 235 208 443 4 50 54 713 
BBB- 3 103 106 171 19 190 2 26 28 324 
BB+ 9 67 76 28 7 35 0 5 5 116 
BB 12 45 57 21 2 23 0 3 3 83 
BB- 22 31 53 2 4 6 0 4 4 63 
B+ 34 28 62 6 6 12 1 6 7 81 
B 45 15 60 6 1 7 1 2 3 70 
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Table 3 
Variables and Definitions 
Variable  Definition 
OFFER SPREAD Offer yield less yield on a comparable maturity Treasury bond  
                               Economic Environment 
LEVEL The one year Treasury yield 
SLOPE The difference between the 10-year and one year Treasury interest rates 
VOLATILITY Interest rate volatility as measured by five year at the money caps. 
CREDIT SPREAD The credit spread as measured by the difference between the average yield on the 
Merrill Lynch high yield index and the one year Treasury yield. 
  
 Asymmetric Information 
SHELF A dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the bond is a shelf registered bond 
according to rule 415, 0 otherwise 
BANK A dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the company issuing the bond was a 
bank, a finance company or a savings and loan company, 0 otherwise 
  
 Agency 
PRIVATE A dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 is the bond is a private rule 144a issue, 
zero otherwise. 
COMPANY SIZE The log of the issuing company’s assets 
ROA The return on assets of the issuing company 
RATING A 21 point rating scale where AAA is 21, AA+ is 20 and so on until CCC- is 3, CC is 2 
and C/D is 1. 
SECURITY Coded from 1 to 7 in increasing order of security. Junior Subordinate (7), Junior (6), 
Subordinate (5), None (4), Senior Subordinate (3), Senior (2), Senior Secure (1) 
B- 33 8 41 3 0 3 0 2 2 46 
CCC+ 10 2 12 1 0 1 0 1 1 14 
CCC 2 0 2         2 
CCC- 1 0 1         1 
CC 1 0 1             1 
Total 625 1527 2152 2087 1088 3175 36 413 449 5776 
Rating A- A- A- A A A A+ A- A- A- 
Maturity 
15.55 9.31 11.12 14.00 4.58 
10.7
7 24.77 11.60 12.65 11.05 
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RESTRICT A dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the bond contains a company or 
subsidiary restrictive covenant or a bond protective covenant, zero otherwise 
COMPETITIVE A dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the bond issue sale was competitive, 0 
otherwise 
 Control Variables/ Variables Unique to the Pricing Equation 
ISSUE AMOUNT Log of the dollar amount of the bond issue 
MATUTITY Log of the number of days a bond is scheduled to mature as of the date of issue 
TDR The total debt ratio of the issuing company 
QR The quick liquidity ratio of the issuing company 
FINANCIAL A dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the company issuing the bond was in 
the Finance industry, 0 otherwise 
UTILITY A dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the company issuing the bond was in 
the Utility industry, 0 otherwise 
CALLABLE A dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the bond is callable, zero otherwise 
MILLSOC The inverse mills ratio for ordinary callable bonds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Selection Model for Callable and Non-callable Bonds 
This table reports the results of a probit regression of callable verses non-callable bonds 
on variables that determine the popularity of ordinary callable and non-callable bonds. All 
variables are defined in Table 3. 
 Ordinary Callable/Non-callable 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 3.264*** 0.548 
LEVEL -0.734*** 0.039 
SLOPE    -0.487*** 0.048 
VOLATILITY -0.037*** 0.007 
CREDIT SPREAD       -0.046*** 0.015 
SHELF 0.456*** 0.094 
BANK 1.135*** 0.062 
PRIVATE -0.180 0.116 
COMPANY SIZE     0.083*** 0.013 
ROA      -0.016*** 0.006 
RATING -0.085*** 0.009 
SECURITY    0.056 0.063 
RESTRICT -0.210*** 0.080 
COMPETITIVE 0.725*** 0.237 
ISSUE AMOUNT -0.197*** 0.015   
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MATURITY 1.260*** 0.036   
N 5,776    
CASE CORRECT 5,025    
NUMBER CALLABLE 2,748    
PSEUDO R2 0.647    
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 ,*** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Offer spreads for Callable and Non-callable Bonds 
This table reports the variables that determine the offer spread for new issues of 
callable and non-callable bonds. The inverse mills ratio MILLSOC report the 
difference in the offer spread for ordinary callable bond relative to non-callable bonds. 
All variables are defined in Table 3. 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 3.531*** 0.305 
SECURITY    0.049 0.044 
RESTRICT 0.171*** 0.037 
RATING -0.183*** 0.005 
SHELF -0.245*** 0.058 
PRIVATE 0.647*** 0.079 
COMPETITIVE -0.477*** 0.167 
FINANCE 0.046 0.039 
UTILITY -0.026 0.045 
COMPANY SIZE     0.002 0.008 
TDR 0.002*** 0.000 
QR       -0.004* 0.002 
ROA      -0.002 0.005 
 28 
LEVEL -0.087*** 0.017 
SLOPE    -0.127*** 0.024 
VOLATILITY -0.008** 0.003 
CREDIT SPREAD 0.189*** 0.007 
CALLABLE 0.243*** 0.042 
MILLSOC -0.087*** 0.020 
N 5776  
R2 0.485  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Selection Model for Callable and Non-callable bonds Stratified by Rating 
This table reports the results of a probit regression of callable verses non-callable bonds 
on variables that determine the popularity of ordinary callable and non-callable bonds. All 
variables are defined in Table 3. 
 AAA to AA- A+ to BBB- BB+ and lower 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
CONSTANT 5.970*** 2.185 -6.492*** 0.992 3.834*** 1.399 
LEVEL -1.252*** 0.122 -0.462*** 0.061 -0.346*** 0.110 
SLOPE    -0.990*** 0.135 -0.248*** 0.081 -0.314** 0.133 
VOLATILITY -0.044** 0.021 -0.004 0.010 -0.005 0.024 
CREDIT SPREAD       -0.041 0.044 -0.064** 0.026 -0.007 0.049 
SHELF 3.225*** 0.362 0.957*** 0.186 -0.469** 0.211 
BANK 0.488** 0.196 1.364*** 0.097 0.990*** 0.270 
PRIVATE N/A N/A -1.588*** 0.272 -0.453** 0.223 
COMPANY SIZE     -0.225*** 0.036 0.466*** 0.024 -0.223*** 0.045 
ROA      -0.063*** 0.019 -0.055*** 0.013 -0.006 0.008 
SECURITY    0.038 0.284 -0.034 0.122 0.214* 0.119 
RESTRICT -1.403*** 0.227 -0.922*** 0.151 0.280 0.196 
COMPETITIVE 1.215 0.995 1.559*** 0.417 0.904* 0.465 
ISSUE AMOUNT -0.054* 0.032 -0.095*** 0.032 -0.213*** 0.052 
MATURITY 0.874*** 0.102 1.800*** 0.065 0.648*** 0.136 
N 1,197  4,102  477  
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CASE CORRECT 1,119  3,657  364  
NUMBER CALLABLE  717   1,793   238  
PSEUDO R2 0.774  0.632  0.304  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 ,*** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Offer spreads for Callable and Non-callable Bonds Stratified by Rating 
This table reports the variables that determine the offer spread for new issues of 
callable and non-callable bonds. The inverse mills ratio MILLSOC report the 
difference in the offer spread for ordinary callable bond relative to non-callable bonds. 
All variables are defined in Table 3. 
 AAA to AA- A+ to BBB- BB+ and lower 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
CONSTANT 0.480* 0.285 1.595*** 0.349 0.915 1.528 
SECURITY    -0.088*** 0.034 -0.088* 0.051 0.449*** 0.141 
RESTRICT 0.406*** 0.088 0.297*** 0.032 -0.111 0.188 
SHELF -0.540*** 0.104 -0.056 0.078 -0.433* 0.259 
PRIVATE 1.171*** 0.227 0.688*** 0.100 0.449 0.291 
COMPETITIVE -0.530*** 0.074 -0.305*** 0.117 -1.014** 0.475 
FINANCE -0.009 0.062 0.032 0.039 0.437 0.294 
UTILITY 0.223*** 0.079 0.040 0.040 -0.121 0.363 
COMPANY SIZE     0.040*** 0.009 -0.026** 0.010 -0.076 0.070 
TDR -0.002** 0.001 0.003*** 0.001 0.004* 0.002 
QR       0.005 0.016 -0.010*** 0.002 -0.071** 0.031 
ROA      -0.003 0.006 -0.012*** 0.004 -0.017 0.012 
LEVEL 0.121*** 0.033 -0.122*** 0.014 -0.221 0.151 
SLOPE    0.109*** 0.029 -0.136*** 0.024 -0.309 0.200 
VOLATILITY 0.001 0.005 -0.005 0.003 0.037 0.037 
CREDIT SPREAD 0.056*** 0.010 0.224*** 0.007 0.100 0.071 
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CALLABLE 0.093 0.062 0.188*** 0.037 -0.133 0.194 
MILLSOC -0.183*** 0.035 -0.060*** 0.016 0.239 0.300 
N 1,197   4,102   477   
R^2 0.099   0.366   0.153   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Selection Model for Callable and Non-callable bonds Stratified by Financial and 
Non-financial 
This table reports the results of a probit regression of callable verses non-callable bonds 
on variables that determine the popularity of ordinary callable and non-callable bonds. All 
variables are defined in Table 3. 
 
 Financial Non-financial 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
CONSTANT -4.069*** 1.232 5.164*** 0.723 
LEVEL -0.840*** 0.069 -0.568*** 0.053 
SLOPE    -0.708*** 0.083 -0.219*** 0.071 
VOLATILITY -0.041*** 0.011 -0.028*** 0.009 
CREDIT SPREAD       -0.180*** 0.025 0.044* 0.024 
SHELF 1.465*** 0.237 0.198* 0.114 
PRIVATE ISSUE -0.067 0.325 0.029 0.130 
COMPANY SIZE     0.075*** 0.025 0.047** 0.022 
ROA      -0.187*** 0.017 0.031*** 0.006 
RATING -0.005*** 0.016 -0.133*** 0.013 
SECURITY    0.718*** 0.181 0.041 0.074 
RESTRICT -1.203*** 0.181 0.387*** 0.095 
COMPETITIVE N/A N/A 0.471* 0.255 
ISSUE SIZE 0.081*** 0.027 -0.347*** 0.022 
MATURITY 1.875*** 0.068 0.760*** 0.057 
N 3,175   2,601  
CASE CORRECT 2,921  2,212  
NUMBER CALLABLE   2,087  661  
PSEUDO R2 0.765  0.411  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 ,*** p < 0.01 
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Table 9 
Offer spreads for Callable and Non-callable Bonds Stratified by Rating 
This table reports the variables that determine the offer spread for new issues of 
callable and non-callable bonds. The inverse mills ratio MILLSOC report the 
difference in the offer spread for ordinary callable bond relative to non-callable bonds. 
All variables are defined in Table 3. 
 Financial Non-financial 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
CONSTANT 3.050*** 0.655 4.619*** 0.421 
SECURITY    0.041 0.107 0.048 0.045 
RESTRICT 0.400*** 0.103 0.072* 0.038 
RATING -0.174*** 0.006 -0.191*** 0.009 
SHELF -0.370** 0.145 -0.160** 0.064 
PRIVATE 0.164 0.217 0.681*** 0.082 
COMPETITIVE -1.600*** 0.155 -0.409** 0.178 
COMPANY SIZE     0.023** 0.009 0.001 0.013 
TDR 0.002*** 0.001 0.000 0.001 
QR       0.019*** 0.005 -0.013*** 0.003 
ROA      -0.003 0.014 -0.005 0.005 
LEVEL -0.117*** 0.023 -0.151*** 0.030 
SLOPE    -0.210*** 0.031 -0.110** 0.043 
VOLATILITY -0.001 0.003 -0.020*** 0.005 
CREDIT SPREAD 0.191*** 0.008 0.144*** 0.015 
CALLABLE 0.488*** 0.072 0.134* 0.081 
MILLSOC 0.081* 0.048 -0.168*** 0.027 
N 3,175   2,601   
R^2 0.508   0.495   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 
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Figure 1 
The proportion of all new issues of US dollar, fixed coupon corporate bonds that are 
callable and non-callable bonds by year from 1995 to 2007 
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